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Goldberg: Sex and Attorney-Client Relationship

SEX AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP:
AN ARGUMENT FOR A PROPHYLACTIC RULE
by
NANCY E. GOLDBERG*
[S]exual episodes with clients jeopardize the attorney client
relationship and have a strong potential to involve the attorney in a
breach of one or more Disciplinary Rules. I
INTRODUCTION
The initiation of a sexual relationship between an attorney and client, during
the course of the attorney's representation of the client, raises ethical problems.
Although many 2 agree that attorneys should avoid such relationships, they balk at
drawing a bright line rule which explicitly prohibits an attorney from extending the
parameters of the professional relationship to include personal interaction with
clients. In at least one state, California, the need for drawing such a bright line has
been recognized by the bar. The California Bar recently submitted Proposed Rule
3-120 to the California Supreme Court. 3 The proposed rule expressly governs
sexual relations between an attorney and a client. The express recognition given to
this ethical question is anamolous.
Despite a relative dearth of case law and commentaries on this specific issue,
another closely related profession, the medical profession, has advanced cogent
4
arguments for proscribing similar activity within those professional relationships.
Although the bright line drawn in the medical field appears to be readily accepted,
the application of a similar proscription to attorneys is deemed to be unnecessary
and unduly burdensome. The same rationales which are applied to the physician patient relationship also apply to the attorney-client relationship. Therefore, a
Lecturer in Law, West Virginia University College of Law.

Presently, Director of Legal Analysis

Program, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. B.A., 1981, Franklin & Marshall
College; M.A., 1985, Brown University; J.D., 1988, The Dickinson School of Law.
1 Matter of Liebowitz, 516 A.2d 246, 248 (N.J. 1985) (citation omitted) (quoting Special Ethics Master).
2 References to positions proposed by many throughout the paper refer to arguments raised to the author by
attorneys in informal conversations. A number of the comments were raised by a helpful, albeit skeptical,
group of law school professors at the A.A.L.S. Workshop for New Law Teachers held in the summer of
1989. Although the majority of those who discussed the issue were skeptical of the need for such a
proposal, no quantificational studies were undertaken. Thus, the use of many is used as a shorthand
method of referring to these informal discussions and is in no way intended to suggest a position held by
the majority of the Bar.
3 CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3-120 (Draft Rule F 1991) (adopted by the
California Supreme Court, in modified form, on August 13, 1992).
4 See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Undue Influence, Confidential Relationship, and the Psychology of
Transference, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 197 (1970); Robert Simon, Sexual Misconduct of Therapists, 21
TRIAL 46 (May 1985).
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similar conclusion is mandated: the express prohibition of sexual relationships
between an attorney and client.
In this paper, I argue that the initiation of sexual contact during the tenure of
an attorney-client relationship is unethical and should be explicitly proscribed by
the rules governing professional conduct. Although such behavior may be
implicitly prohibited by existing disciplinary provisions, 5 I advocate the
promulgation of a bright line rule. Drawing such a line is required by reasons
similar to those applicable in the medical profession. Additional rationales exist as
well, which are unique to the legal profession.
Opponents of a bright line rule might grudgingly concede that intimate
contact between an attorney and a client should not be condoned in the family law
setting. 6 According to these objectors, if the regulation of such conduct must occur,
it should be narrowly tailored to these clear cut situations which unquestionably
offend our ethical intuitions. Although such behavior seems most egregious in
domestic cases, this alone does not preclude drawing bright line rules. The
proscriptions advanced here are not limited to any specific type of legal problem
with which the client is faced; that is, the bright line being advanced applies to all
attorneys and to all areas of law.
Furthermore, the focus of this paper is on sexual relationships arising after
the attomey-client relationship has begun. Representation of a client with whom the
attorney is already sexually involved, and sexual relations arising subsequent to
termination of the attorney-client relationship raise different issues. Rather than
detract from the argument in support of the proposed new bright line rule, these
7
issues are being left for another day, another paper.
The first part of this paper discusses the scope of the problem. Justifications
for establishing a bright line rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual relations are
then considered. Proposed solutions, including specific language for a line-drawing
rule, and potential objections are then advanced and discussed.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: ATI'ORNEY-CLIENT SEXUAL RELATIONS
Attorneys who have engaged in sexual relationships with clients have
sometimes faced an array of disciplinary actions. Such conduct, however, is
5 For purposes of this paper, the existing disciplinary provisions are the American Bar Association's Model
Code of Professional Responsibility [Code], adopted August 1969, and the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct [Rules], adopted August 2, 1983.
6 Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. has noted that sexual relations between an attorney and client in a domestic case,
usually with a male attorney and a female client, "is an inherently exploitive situation." Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Lawyer-Client Sex Relations Are Taboo, NATLLJ., April 15, 1991, at 13.
7 The discussions in this paper are advanced in terms of male attorneys engaging in sexual contact with
female clients. This is done for simplicity only, and the arguments are equally applicable to attorneys of
either sex having contact with clients of either sex.
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frequently not reported to disciplinary authorities. 8 This leads some attorneys to
scoff at the idea that such conduct takes place. Others may concede that it takes
place but deny that it is detrimental to the client. Nonetheless, as a review of the
existing cases shows, the problem is real9 and the consequences can be harmful.
In Committee On ProfessionalEthics and Conduct v. Durham,10 an attorney
was publically reprimanded and admonished for her conduct of kissing, caressing,
and fondling her client when she visited him in a professional capacity at the
penitentiary. The Supreme Court of Iowa imposed a public reprimand and
admonishment for the attorney's violation of Ethical Considerations (EC) 1-5 and
9-6 and Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102 (A)(6) of the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers (ICPRL). t t While acknowledging that the Code
offered little guidance on the question of sexual conduct, the court stated that
"[s]exual contact with a client in a professional context is not activity which a
reasonable member of the bar would suppose to be allowed by the ICPRL. Such
conduct is well outside that which could be termed temperate and dignified and
would amount to professional impropriety... ."12

The Supreme Court of Iowa again faced a case involving sexual contact
between an attorney and client in Committee On ProfessionalEthics and Conduct
of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Hill.'3 Hill was a domestic matter involving
dissolution of marriage and custody issues. The client was indigent and offered to
engage in sexual relations with her attorney for money. Noting the potential
prejudice to the client from this sexual contact and her minor children, the court

8 Reported cases of such misconduct may be the tip of the iceberg, as is the case for reported rapes.

For

example, a law student reported an incident in which, shortly after her eighteenth birthday, she found
herself possibly facing criminal charges for involvement with a juvenile who had been stealing checks
from his grandfather, cashing them, and using the money to purchase marijuana. The student's mother
called an attorney whom they knew and set up an appointment for her. When she visited the attorney, he
told her that he wanted to show the prosecution that she had suffered enough from the boy's accusation.
To this end, the attorney said that he needed to take her blood pressure and heartbeat. He took her blood
pressure and lifted her shirt up to place the stethoscope over her heart, asking her "you don't embarrass

easily, do you?" The student, who was already emotionally upset, having lost 15 pounds in a week and
fearing that her future dream to be a lawyer was ruined, would have done most anything the attorney asked
to get out of the trouble; nonetheless, his demeanor made her very apprehensive and she terminated the
interview. The student never met with the attorney alone again, although he suggested to her several
times that they meet after hours at his office. She did not inform anyone of the attorney's actions until

years later. When asked why she did not report the attorney, she indicated that no one would believe her,
as it was her word against his, and that if anyone believed her, no one would care, as he has a good
reputation as a lawyer and is related to many individuals in that town. Of most concern to the student was
the fact that her coming forward would adversely affect her professional future, precluding her from ever
obtaining a job in this small West Virginia town or perhaps in West Virginia at all.
9 See Hazard, supra note 6, at 14.
10 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979).

11 The court noted that "EC 1-5 calls upon an attorney to be 'temperate and dignified.' DR 1-102(A)(6)
bars conduct 'that adversely reflects on his (or her) fitness to practice law.' EC 9-6 prohibits conduct
indicating professional impropriety or the appearance thereof."

Durham, 279 N.W.2d at 283.

121d at284.
13 436 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1989).
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upheld the commission's finding that Hill's conduct violated DR 1-102 (A)(3) and
(6) and EC 1-5 and EC 9-6.14 In suspending Mr. Hill's license to practice law
indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for three months, the court stated
that "[w]e require lawyers to maintain high standards of ethical conduct and to
avoid conduct which would reflect negatively upon the integrity and honor of the
profession .... Sexual contact between an attorney and client in a professional
context constitutes professional impropriety."'15 The two dissenting justices
advocated license suspension for not less than nine months, noting that the
attorney's "acts constitute grossly unethical and unprofessional conduct." 6
Yet another example of misconduct occurred in Matter of Wood.' 7 Attorney
Wood was disciplined for attempting to exchange legal services for sexual favors.
The Supreme Court of Indiana indicated that it did not intend to regulate the sexual
conduct of its bar except where the conduct is professionally related and the
attorney's fitness to practice law is in question. The court suspended the attorney
from practicing law for not less than one year, finding a violation of DR 1102(A)(6) and DR 5-101(A). ' 8
14 DR 1-102(A)(3) and (6) provide, in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
MODELCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY, DR 1-102 (A) (3), (6); quoted in 436 N.W.2d at 58.
EC 1-5 provides:
A lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct and should encourage
fellow lawyers to do likewise. He should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain
from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in society, even
minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal
profession.
EC 9-6 provides:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession... to
conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the
confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not
only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 1-5, 9-6; quoted in 436 N.W.2d at 58.
15 Id. at 59 (Snell, J., dissenting). After reinstatement, Mr. Hill received a public reprimand from the
Supreme Court of Iowa on an unrelated disciplinary action. Committee On Professional Ethics and
Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d I (Iowa 1990).
16 436 N.W.2d at 59 (Snell, J., dissenting).
17 358 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1976).
18 The court noted that DR 5-101(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys, at Law and
the Oath of Attorneys for members of the Indiana State Bar "provides that a lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may
be affected by his own personal interests." 358 N.E.2d at 133. Since it did not find "the requisite disclosure

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss1/3

4

Goldberg: Sex and Attorney-Client Relationship

Summer, 1992]

SEX AND ArrORNEY-C LIENT RELATIONSHIP

The Indiana court had the opportunity to review Mr. Wood's behavior ten
years later when he offered to reduce his legal fees to a client in exchange for
sexual favors.' 9 The court determined that he had violated DR 1-102 (A)(3),(4),(5)
and (6) and DR 5-101 (A). Noting the attorney's exploitation of the client, lack of
professionalism, disdain for professional ethics, and the need for integrity and
protection of the public, the court disbarred the attorney.
In Matter of Adams, 2 an attorney was publically reprimanded and
admonished for exploiting the dependence of a client for his own pleasure when he
grabbed her, kissed her, and raised her blouse. The Indiana court disciplined the
attorney for violation of DR 1-102 (A)(3) and (6).
Similar problems have been reported in other jurisdictions. The Colorado
Supreme Court addressed the issue in People v. Gibbons.2 ' The attorney in
Gibbons was alleged to have had sexual relations with a client. The attorney
admitted that the relationship violated DR 5-101 (A) and DR 7-101 (A)(3). The
Grievance Committee found that the client was dependent and possibly not able to
wisely choose relationships. The court noted that the client was 43 years younger
than the attorney, had a ninth grade education, and was a defendant in a criminal
proceeding.22 Considering all the violations together, the court disbarred the
attorney. 2
Similarly, in Matter of Liebowitz, 24 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
publically reprimanded an attorney for making sexual advances toward a client in
violation of DR 1-102 (A)(5). 25 The attorney had told the client, an indigent
matrimonial client assigned to him, that his associate would represent her. 3 The
court relied on the Special Ethics Master's findings of the attorney's superior
position, the presence of coercion, and the consequent lack of consent by the
client.2 2 The court also indicated that the relationship must be viewed from the

by an attorney and waiver of-the ethical conflict by the client which would permit such conflict to exist,"
the court imposed discipline on Mr. Wood for a violation of this disciplinary rule. Id.
19 In re Woods, 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1986).
20 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981).
21 685 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1984).
22 U at 175.
231,
24 516 A.2d 246 (N.J. 1985).
25 Id at 249.
26
d at 247.
27 Id. at 248.
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client's perspective. Hence, his assignment of the case to an associate did not
excuse his behavior.28 The court ordered public reprimand, 29 stating that the
purpose of disciplinary procedures is to protect the public.
The list of examples goes on. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled on a
question of sexual impropriety by an attorney in Courtney v. Alabama State Bar.30
In that case, the attorney was charged with violating DR 1-102 (A)(6) 31 when he
touched his client's guardian during a scheduled meeting. Noting that the attorney
had received private admonition in response to a similar claim two months earlier
and had other prior violations as well, the court affirmed the ordering of public
censure.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Meredith,3 an attorney had been
representing a woman, individually and as guardian of her child, in several suits
arising out of a will contest. The attorney had entered into an intimate sexual
relationship with the client. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in publically
reprimanding the attorney for violating DR 1-102 (A)(6) and 5- 101(A), 33 noted the
trial commissioner's finding that the relationship could have affected the client's
credibility as a witness. The court further stated that "there was reasonable
probability that the lawyer's personal and emotional involvement with the mother
could have adversely affected the advice or services rendered during his
employment." 34
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has also taken a stand on the ethics of
attorney-client sexual relations. The court suspended an attorney's license for three
years after he had sexual contact with a client. Here, the attorney had represented
the client in a divorce case involving custody, and he knew that she had been
emotionally, physically, and sexually abused. 35 The referee noted the seriousness
of the conduct, as well as the client's vulnerability and the attorney's knowledge of
and indifference to that vulnerability.36
28 Id. at 249. In other words, despite his delegation of the case to an associate, it was normal for the
client, a lay person, to continue to believe that Mr. Liebowitz was still her attorney.
29Id
30 492 So. 2d 1002 (Ala. 1986).
31 The court noted that DR 1-102(A)(6) "states that '[a] lawyer shall not ... [elngage in any . .. conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.'" 492 So. 2d at 1003.
32 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988).
33 The court also found that Meredith violated DR 4-101 (B) and (C) when he revealed confidential
information in an affidavit, which was adverse to that client's interests, without his former client's
permission. Id at 788.

341td

35 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Alvin L. Woodmansee, 434 N.W.2d 94 (Wis. 1989). Mr.
Woodmansee was also convicted of fourth-degree sexual assault on the client as a result of his conducL
36 Id The client had been under the care of a psychologist and psychiatrist, facts which the referee found
that the attorney had known. As a result of the incident, the client became suicidal and required
hospitalization. Id. at 95-96.
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently suspended a public defender's
license for six months after he engaged in sexual relations with a client. 37 The court
adopted the referee's findings and conclusions, which cited both conflicts of
38
interests and the client's vulnerability as reasons for suspension.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire also recently suspended an
attorney's license for two years for engaging in sexual relations, on three occasions,
with a divorce client who was under psychiatric care for agoraphobia. 3 The court
accepted the referee's findings that such conduct violated Rule 1.7 (b), Rule 1.8 (b),
and Rule 1.14 (a). 40
Sexual relations between attorneys and clients have also been the subject of
several Ethics Opinions. An opinion in Maryland noted that a sexual relationship
between attorney and client "reflects negatively on the integrity of the legal
profession... [and] may have an adverse effect on the lawyer's ability to protect
his client's interests." 4 1 The Opinion recommended that the attorney withdraw
from representation.
An Ethics Opinion of the Oregon State Bar42 stated that an attorney-client
sexual relationship is unethical in a divorce action since the attorney's judgement
might be impaired and the client's best interest might be harmed. Further, the Bar
explained that:
the client may be unable to give a voluntary and informed consent to
continued representation. The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary
relationship, one of trust. The nature of that fiduciary relationship tends
to make the client intellectually and, in many cases, emotionally
dependent upon the attorney. If the client becomes involved in a love
affair with the attorney, that dependency would only be increased.3
In an earlier Legal Ethics Opinion,44 the Oregon Bar had stated that sexual
relations with a client was permissible as long as the legal proceeding was not a
divorce action in which the affair would be harmful to the client's interest or
interfere with the attorney's aggressive representation. This advisory opinion was
37 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Larry R. Ridgeway, 462 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1990). In addition to
the sexual contact, the disciplinary action involved his providing beer to the client while knowing that the
consumption of alcohol violated the terms of her parole.
38 ut at 672.
39 Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990).
40
Id. at 1202 (citing Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052 (N.H. 1989)).
41 ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ETHICS OPINIONS 801:4334, Opinion 849 (1980-1985).
42 Legal Ethics Opinion No. 475, cited in Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 384 n.1 1 (1983).
43

1,d
44 Ore. State Bar, Legal Ethics Opinion, No. 429 (1979).
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withdrawn, however, in June, 1982 when the later opinion was issued. The
Oregon bar explained its change of position, noting that an affair would render the
attorney unable to determine if the relationship would interfere with the client's
interests.
Hence, the above review of case law and Ethics Opinions shows that
attorney-client sexual contacts during the course of representation do exist, and
further reveals that such contacts, when reported, have not been condoned by those
responsible for enforcing the ethical standards of the profession. Although these
decisions hold that the sexual relations are unethical, no explicit proscriptions have
provided the basis for imposing sanctions. Rather, such conduct is found to be
implicitly barred by the governing disciplinary codes. Review of these existing
provisions shows how tenuous the relation is between the general cited provision
and the proscribed behavior.
The use of such implicit prohibitions permit varied interpretations, fudging,
and frequent denial. Although implicit proscriptions are concededly better than
none, many cases which would fall within the ambit of an express rule go
unnoticed and unpunished. Furthermore, the sole use of implicit prohibitions fails
to deter the unwanted behavior in the first instance.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEXUAL RELATIONS
SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED
Various justifications-exist for prohibiting sexual relations between an
attorney and client during representation. Some are drawn from the analogous
situation in the medical profession and focus on the client, namely, the notions of
transference and fiduciary responsibility. Others recognize effects on the attorney,
including conflicts of interest and diminished competency. Yet others look to the
reputation of the profession and the appearance of impropriety which such
attorney-client relationships implicate. Each of these rationales is considered in
turn.
Client-OrientedRationales
The impropriety of sexual contact between a professional and a client has
been explored most thoroughly in the therapist-patient context. The primary
reasons for prohibiting such contact include the existence of the transference
phenomenon and the fiduciary nature of the professional's role. These doctrines,
which are explained below, are equally applicable in the attorney-client context.

45 See, e.g.. Shaffer, supra note 4; Simon, supra note 4.
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a.Transference
46
In the most general of terms, transference refers to the feelings a patient
develops toward her therapist, while countertransference denotes the feelings the
therapist has for the patient. Psychiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, and courts have
attempted to define the phenomenon. 47 In psychoanalytic terms, transference refers
to the patient's displacement of:

the feelings he originally directed toward the earlier objects onto the
analyst, who then becomes alternately a friend and an enemy, one who
is nice to him and one who frustrates his needs and punishes him, one
who is loved and hated as the original objects were loved and hated.
Moreover, this tendency persists, so that to an increasing extent the
patient's feelings toward the analyst replicate his feelings toward the
specific people he is talking about or, more accurately, those whom his
unconscious is talking about. 41
More generally, the term has been defined as an "[u]nconscious
phenomenon in which the feelings, attitudes, and wishes originally linked with
important figures in one's early life are projected onto others who have come to
represent them in current life."'' This definition makes no explicit reference to
therapists.
Other definitions of "transference" have been offered. Carl Rogers has
indicated that transference refers to "attitudes transferred to the therapist which
were originally directed, with more justification, toward a parent or other
person." ) Ernest Jones has claimed that it is "displacement of an affect, either
positive or negative, from one person on to the psycho-analyst." 5'One court, in
discussing transference, noted that the phenomenon refers to:
the emotional reaction which the patient in therapy has toward the
therapist. The patient in therapy 'unconsciously attributes to the
psychiatrist or analyst those feelings which he may have repressed
towards his own parents.'.. .'Inappropriate emotions, both hostile and

46 For purposes of this paper, references to patients are applicable to clients and vice versa.
7

4 See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 4; Simon, supra note 4; L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
48
ALFRED FREEDMAN, HAROLD KAPLAN, and BENJAMIN SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1 563 (2d ed. 1975).
491d.at 2608.

50 C. R OGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 198 (Houghton Mifflin ed. 1965), cited with approval,
Shaffer, supra note 4, at 205.
51 E. JONES, PAPERS ON PSYCHO-ANALYSiS 500 (Beacon ed. 1961), cited with approval Shaffer, supra note
4, at 205.
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loving, directed toward the physician are recognized by the psychiatrist
52
as constituting ... the transference.'
In essence, then, transference denotes the strong feelings the patient develops
toward the therapist. These feelings are generally misplaced when directed toward
the therapist; that is, they would be more appropriately expressed to other areas of
importance in the patient's life. As the above definitions suggest, the patient
expresses towards the therapist unconscious feelings and emotions which arose in
the past, in connection with another important person. In developing the therapeutic
relationship, the patient transfers these past feelings onto the therapist, in the
present. Although this transfer of feelings is present in all relationships in which a
person is engaged, it is greatly intensified in the therapeutic relationship.
Transference is the tool used in therapy. The therapist offers himself as a
sort of blank slate upon which the transference can develop or be expressed. With
this "recreation" of the feelings in the therapeutic setting, then, analysis and
evaluation of the transfer of emotion accesses the patient's unconscious and enables
the therapist to help the patient.
It is often the misuse or mishandling of the transference phenomenon that
results in sexual relationships between therapists and their patients. As one doctor
notes, "[slexual intimacy with patients is . . . an occupational hazard of
psychotherapists who work intensively with patients." B A patient experiencing
transference is dependent upon the therapists and vulnerable to exploitation. 55
Since positive transferences are often expressed in sexual terms, 56 mismanagement
of these transfers by the therapist may lead to acting on the feelings rather than an
analysis of them. And since the patient is so dependent on and vulnerable to the
therapist, such action on the therapist's part constitutes abuse of the transference
phenomenon and exploitation of the patient.
Abuse and mismanagement of the transference phenomenon, resulting in a
sexual relationship between therapist and patient, has been the subject of litigation.
One case which discusses transference is L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 57which
involved issues relating to the liability of a psychiatrist's malpractice insurer for
harm resulting from sexual acts with a patient. In discussing coverage, the
Wisconsin appellate court included lengthy discourse about transference and the
deleterious effects of therapist-patient sexual contact. The court cited many
authorities, including the American Medical Association's Principles of Medical
52 L.L. v. Medical Protective Company, 362 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. CL App. 1984) (citations omitted).
53 Simon, supra note 4, at 47.
54 LL, 362 N.W.2d at 177; Shaffer, supra note 4, at 211.
55 Simon, supra note 4, at 48.
56 Freedman et al, supra note 48, at 1552.
57 362 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. CL App. 1984).
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Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry,58 for its assertion that
sex with a patient constitutes malpractice in that it harms and exploits the patient. 0
The court defined transference and recognized the dependence of the patient. After
further noting the trust required for a therapeutic relationship and the abandonment
of the relationship which occurs when the therapist takes advantage of that trust,
the court concluded that:
a sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be viewed
separately from the therapeutic relationship that has developed between
them. The transference phenomenon makes it impossible that the
patient will have the same emotional response to sexual contact with
the therapist that he or she would have to sexual contact with other
persons. Further, by introducing sexual activity into the relationship,
the therapist runs the risk of causing additional psychological damage
to the patient f'
This court recognized, then, the kind of coloring effect that transference has on the
patient. It is not just that the patient is unable to consent or that the therapist and1
6
patient are on an unequal footing, notions which are dealt with in the next section;
rather, because of the transference the patient does not respond to the contact with
the therapist similarly to contact with other people.
Another case in which the court mentioned the transference phenomenon is
Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau. 62 The district court
cited L.L. for its assertions concerning transference and patient dependency and
vulnerability. The court noted that "the patient believes the doctor is always acting
in her best interest, to make her well. What to the therapist may seem extraneous
is, to the patient, part of the whole relationship." 63 In addition to the added factor of
the patient's belief that the doctor's actions are solely for her benefit, this court, like
the court in L.L., noted the coloring of the patient's perception by the transference,
particularly of her perception of the relationship and her inability to separate the
various components thereof. 6,
Misuse of the transference relationship by medical professionals, then, has
been a litigated issue. Courts recognize that therapists should not have sex with

58 See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
59 362 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted).
60 362 N.W.2d at 178.
61 See infra text accompanying notes 75-101.
62 626 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
63 626 F. Supp. at 266.

641Id
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their patients since the transference phenomenon makes patients dependent,
vulnerable, and colors their perspective and ability to respond. 65
The transference phenomenon is not limited to therapist-patient
relationships, but also pervades other professional relationships, including that
between attorneys and clients. Transference is prevalent in relationships where the
client is dependent on the professional to whom she has turned for help, where a
"rapport" has been established in the professional relationship. The professional is
important to the client and is to heed the best interest of the client. Dr. Stone has
recognized that "there is no doubt that transference enters into many relationships:
teacher-student, lawyer-client, physician-patient, and so on." 6
Another commentator refers to other authors who have noted the prevalence
of the phenomenon:
Dr. Andrew S. Watson suggests that transference is an essential 'tool'
in the relationship between lawyer and client ....He quotes former
Justice Abe Fortas and Talcott Parsons in support of the proposition
that transference and countertransference are commonplace in the law
office .... Dr. Peck suggested that transference is likely to exist in any
professional relationship in which good rapport has been established. 67
Hence, it is evident that other professional relationships, including attorney-client,
involve transference.
Some have objected to the application of this rationale to professionals other
than therapists. Though acknowledging transference in various professional
relationships, these objectors attempt to distinguish therapy from other
professional relationships in that the presence of transference is not as prominent in
non-therapy relationships. For example, in discussing vulnerability and coercion,
Dr. Stone claims that:
these same considerations are often equally relevant to the physicianpatient and the divorce lawyer-client relationship, contexts in which
sexual exploitation allegedly is at least as common as it is in
psychotherapy. Yet courts have not, for example, allowed patients to
sue obstetricians and gynecologists for malpractice when there is also
arguably sexual exploitation of the patient based on transference.
Although in these instances the moral wrong may be as great as it is
65 Another court which recognized the emotional vulnerability of the client, a divorce client already under
psychiatric care for agoraphobia who suffered further rejection when the lawyer terminated the affair, is
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Drucker's Case, 517 A.2d. 1198 (N.H. 1990).
66ALAN STONE, LAW,PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 196 (1984) (emphasis added).

67 Shaffer, supra note 4, at214-15 (footnotes omitted).
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when therapists have sexual conduct with patients, obstetricians,
gynecologists, and lawyers do not hold themselves out as providing a
service or a treatment that has as a central feature managing the
transference and countertransference. This feature of the therapist's role
is a valid justification for the law's singling out psychotherapists. ,
Two points, though, show how this distinction is misguided.
First, contrary to Dr. Stone's assertion, courts do recognize sexual
exploitation in relationships other than therapist-patient. For example, in Hoopes v.
Hammargren,69 the Supreme Court of Nevada examined a patient's claim that her
doctor, a neurosurgeon, took advantage of the doctor-patient relationship and had
sexual contact with her. The court examined the claim more as a violation of a
fiduciary relationship rather than as a misuse of transference, although it did
mention the betrayal of trust, abuse of power, and exploitation inherent in
mismanagement of transference. 70 The court rejected the doctor's assertion that this
type of claim should be limited to therapists. The court stated that "we believe the
fiduciary relationship and the position of trust occupied by all physicians demands
that the standard apply to all physicians." 7' Consequently, the suggestion that only
psychiatrists have been held liable for sexual exploitation is clearly wrong.
Second, critics such as Dr. Stone attempt to distinguish therapists on the
basis that their jobs entail primary manipulation of the transference phenomenon.
This distinction seems artificial, however, as the preceding analysis suggests.
Transference exists in all relationships. However, it is intensified in professional
relationships where the close interaction involves a great deal of confidence, trust,
in
and vulnerability. 72 Although transference is the primary tool used
73
psychotherapy, the fact is that it does exist in other professional relationships. If it
does exist, the person transferring the emotions is likely vulnerable, dependent, and
subject to exploitation. 74 This exploitation by a trusted authority figure, of another
who is vulnerable and needy, is so offensive that liability is imposed upon the
professional provider. The fact that the therapist uses transference primarily and is
trained specifically to encourage and handle the phenomenon makes an abuse by
him especially egregious. It does not, however, excuse professionals in other
disciplines who exploit the vulnerable client.

68STONE, supra note 66, at199.
69 725 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1986).
70 725 P.2d at 242.
71 ,d
72Seesupra text accompanying notes 46-52.

73 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 46-56.
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Consequently, the assertion that transference appears in many professions
and renders the client vulnerable is accurate; and the related attempt to "single out"
therapists and, in a sense, excuse other professionals is most certainly misguided.
When attorneys and non-therapist physicians exploit their patients/clients, their
conduct is similarly reprehensible.
Since an attorney-client relationship includes transference, an attorney should
not engage in sexual relations with his client. The client believes that the attorney is
acting in her best interest. She is unable to judge the intimacy between them in the
same fashion as she could with other people, and she does not separate the sexual
parts of the relationship from the professional parts. Hence, sexual conduct
between the attorney and client constitutes abuse of the transference phenomenon.
b. Fiduciary Responsibilities
Another rationale offered for the proscription of professional-client sex is
that the professional is a fiduciary and such conduct is violative of fiduciary
duties. 75 A fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship in which one person places
complete trust in the other who is bound to act in good faith, in the best interest of
the trusting party. Such a relationship exists:
[w]herever confidence on one side results in superiority and influence
on the other side; where a special confidence is reposed in one who in
equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due
regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence; where
confidence is reposed and accepted, whether the origin is moral, social,
domestic, or merely personal; or where a person has knowledge and
authority which he is bound to exercise for the benefit of another
76
person.
As with the existence of transference, a fiduciary relationship renders the one
reposing trust vulnerable to exploitation by the fiduciary. One court's description
precisely explicated the concept: "[t]he essence of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship is that the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in
whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is
in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party." 77 A
fiduciary, then, is one in whom great trust is placed, one who must advance the
best interest of the client without exploiting her inferior position.

75 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4; Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
76 37 CJ.S. Fraud §2 (1943).
77 Barbara-A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383 (1983).
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A physician acts in a fiduciary capacity with regard to his patient. One doctor
has pertinently observed that a "therapist is in a fiduciary relationship with patients
and thus must act in their best interests. Initiating a sexual relationship is a betrayal
of that trust." 78

Several cases have been reported where the court discussed a doctor's
engaging in sexual relations with a patient as a breach of his fiduciary duty. One
frequently cited case is Roy v. Hartogs.I In denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court found that a fiduciary relationship existed between psychiatrist
and patient and that this relationship was analogous to the fiduciary relationship
between guardian and ward. The court cited a prior case involving seduction of a
ward by a guardian in which the court had said that consent was no excuse:
"[c]onsent obtained under such circumstances is no consent, and should stand for
naught." " The defendant claimed that plaintiffs suit was barred by public policy.
The court rejected this argument, finding that "there is a public policy to protect a
patient from the deliberate and malicious abuse of power and breach of trust by a
psychiatrist when that patient entrusts to him her body and mind in the hope that he
will use his best efforts to effect a cure."8 1
This decision was cited by a Washington court of appeals in addressing a
claim relating to sexual relations between psychiatrist and patient. In Omer v.
Edgren, - the court indicated that Washington also recognizes the fiduciary nature
of the doctor-patient relationship, entailing trust by the patient and requiring good
faith by the doctor. In such a relationship, the patient is held unable to consent to
the sexual relationship.
Horak v. Biris3 depicts the same principle in yet another setting, that of
social worker malpractice. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for
having sex with the plaintiffs wife while the couple was undergoing marriage
counseling. The court found the therapist to have been a fiduciary and stated that:
the very nature of the therapist-patient relationship... gives rise to a
clear duty on the therapist's part to engage only in activity or conduct
which is calculated to improve the patient's mental or emotional well being, and to refrain from any activity or conduct which carries with it
a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of mental or emotional harm to the
84
patient.
78 Simon, supra note 4, at 47.
79 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. Civ. CL 1975).
80 366 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (citing Graham v. Wallace, 63 N.Y.S. 372, 377 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1900)).
81 366 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
82 685 P.2d 635 (Wash. CL App. 1984).
83 474 N.E.2d 13 (i. App. Ct. 1985).
84 474 N.E.2d at 17.
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The court went on to discuss the defendant's mishandling of the transference
phenomenon and the public policy supporting plaintiffs cause of action.
The court in the Hoopes case, considered above, 85 also discussed the
fiduciary nature of a professional relationship. The court based its assertion that all
physicians are bound by the proscriptions on the fact that Nevada recognizes
doctor-patient relationships as fiduciary relationships requiring the "utmost good
faith." 16 The court noted that trust and confidence are implicit elements of fiduciary
relationships; the unequal positions of the fiduciary and the client were also found
to mark such relationships. 87 The court also indicated that a fiduciary's taking
advantage of a vulnerable client "would violate a trust and constitute an abuse of
power. This court would condemn any such type of exploitation. Such conduct
would fall below the acceptable standard for a fiduciary .... [T]he physician's
primary obligation has been, above all, to do no harm." 88
Hence, it is evident that the courts recognize that doctors and therapists have
fiduciary relationships to patients. The doctor is in a superior position, and in him
reposes a great deal of patient trust and confidence. He is expected to act in the
client's best interest rather than do her harm. The client is dependent, vulnerable,
and exploitable and is unable to consent to a sexual relationship with the fiduciary.
Such contact on the part of the fiduciary represents an abuse of his power and a
breach of his fiduciary duties.
Like the doctor-patient relationship, an attorney's relationship with his client
is also of a fiduciary nature. It has been suggested that "[tihe relationship between
an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidlity [sic] and
good faith."89 A court reiterated this notion that "[t]he relation between attorney and
client is a fiduciary relation of the very highest character, and binds the attorney to
most conscientious fidelity. ... "9 Like the physician, then, an attorney should not
exploit his client due to the disparity of power devolving onto the attorney from his
position as a fiduciary. 91
One case in which the court discussed breach of fiduciary duty by an
attorney who had sex with his client is BarbaraA. v. John G. 9 In this case, the
85 See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.

86 725 P.2d at 242.
871ad

88 Id
89 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law §119 (1980) (footnote omitted).
90 Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383 (1983).
91 One case which recognized the emotional vulnerability of the client, the special relationship between
attorney and client, and the power that the attorney holds over the client is McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal.
App. 3d 363 (1991).
92 145 Cal. App. 3d 369 (1983).
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attorney misrepresented to the client that he was sterile, and she subsequently
suffered an ectopic pregnancy. 93 In offering comments for the lower court, the
appellate court defined "fiduciary" and noted that if the court finds such a
relationship, "it is presumed that the one in whom trust and confidence is reposed
has exerted undue influence" 91 and the burden has shifted to the fiduciary.
An appellate court in Illinois recently took a clear stance on the relationship
between attorney-client sexual contact and the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client
when it affirmed the dismissal of an action alleging sexual conduct between an
attorney and client. 5 The court in Suppressed v. Suppressed held that the plaintiff's
complaint failed to adequately plead a breach of fiduciary duty, a legal malpractice
action, in that the breach of duty alleged was not one arising from the attorneyclient relationship. 96 The court acknowledged that a fiduciary relationship exists
between an attorney and client, but it believed that this duty requires only that an
attorney provide competent legal representation. It also claimed that this duty is
dissimilar from a psychotherapist's fiduciary duty, thereby distinguishing
precedent arising in this analogous situation. 97 Absent evidence that the attorney
made the representation contingent upon the sexual contact or that the contact
impaired the attorney's representation of the client, the court declined to find that
the breach rose to the level of legal malpractice. 9
The court's conclusion was based on its view that an attorney-client
relationship differs from a psychotherapist-patient relationship in that the latter
involves the transference phenomenon, while implying that the former does not. 19
93 145 Cal. App. 3d at 374.

94Id at 383.
95 Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (111.App. Ct. 1990).

96 565 N.E.2d at 104. The court also found that the complaint failed to allege actual damages. Based on
its finding that the plaintiff failed to allege an action for legal malpractice, the court concluded that the
five year statute of limitations did not apply; thus, the claim was time-barred.
97
1d at 105.
98 Specifically, the court stated:
An attorney, just like the client, is at best and at worst, a human being fraught with all the
frailties that the status entails. For this reason, we do not believe that the higher standard
of care required of a fiduciary should extend to an attorney's personal relationships with his
client, unless there is tangible evidence that the attorney actually made his professional
services contingent upon his sexual involvement or that his legal representation of the
client was, in fact, adversely affected.
Id
99Id
In making this distinction, the court overlooked the existence of transference in the attorney-client
relationship:
We feel that, essentially, the high standard of care required of a fiduciary imposes upon an
attorney a duty to provide competent legal representation. The fiduciary duty owed by an
attorney differs from the fiduciary duty owed by a psychotherapist ....
Consequently, the
cases cited by plaintiff involving breach of fiduciary duty based on sexual involvement
between a therapist and his patient, while instructive, are distinguishable.
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As discussed above, transference most certainly occurs in attorney-client
relationships, albeit sometimes to a lesser degree. 100 Nonetheless, the phenomenon
does exist, and the existence can color the client's perception of whether the
services are contingent on engaging in the sexual conduct or whether the client's
best interests are being served. Contrary to the court's view, it seems obvious that
the client cannot be said to have given informed consent. Although the Illinois
court appears to have erred in its conclusion concerning the extent of the fiduciary
duty owed by an attorney to a client, the court nonetheless admitted that
"[a]lthough defendant's behavior may have been unethical, we do not think that it
equates to legal malpractice." 01
Despite the Illinois court's claims, the obligations and responsibilities of a
fiduciary are as applicable to an attorney as to a psychotherapist. The attorney must
act in a manner that improves rather than harms the client, without exploiting her
inferior position. Sexual relations with the client, who is not capable of giving her
informed consent in such a situation, would constitute exploitation, as well as a
breach of the attorney's fiduciary duties. As with doctors and therapists, such
behavior on the part of the fiduciary should not be condoned.
We feel that the breach of duty alleged in a legal malpractice action must be more clearly
linked to the attorney's legal representation.
ld. at n.2.
It appears that, when imposing liability upon a psychotherapist of malpractice, courts have relied upon the
fact that the psychological dependency of a patient undergoing therapy often results in a medically
recognized phenomenon known as "transference," whereby the patient transfers feelings to the therapist.
The mishandling of this phenomenon by a trained therapist, resulting in sexual involvement with the
patient, has been deemed malpractice.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 46-74.
101 565 N.E.2d at 105. The court's inability to grasp the dynamics inherent in an attorney-client
relationship and the resultant harm of sexual contact on the professional relationship surfaced again in its
discussion of the damage component of a malpractice action, where it expressed its belief that:
to allow an action for legal malpractice based upon the fact that an intimate relationship
occurred between the attorney and his client during the course of the legal relationship,
when supported only by damages such as mental anguish, shame, humiliation, injury to
feelings, defamation or some unspecified injury to character, would be tantamount to
allowing a claim for seduction, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation to
proceed under less strict standards than required by statute for actions of this type, merely
by virtue of the fact that the parties involved happened to have met in the context of a
legal relationship. Additionally, we feel an obligation to proceed most cautiously because
creation of such a new cause of action could have a serious chilling effect upon all
attorney-client relationships....
565 N.E.2d at 106 n.3.
The attorney in Suppressed subsequently faced an action by a different client, stemming from
allegations of sexual relations, in Doe v. Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. I1. 1991). The Doe factual scenario
depicts an egregious and continuing course of sexual relations and intimidation. The district court
dismissed the amended complaint since there was no allegation of injury to business or property to support
the plaintiffs claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and since it
then lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs pendant state claims based on breach of fiduciary duty and
intentional infliction of emotional distress theories. Id. at 360.
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Thus, the attorney-client relationship involves the transference phenomenon,
and the attorney is imbued with fiduciary responsibilities to the client. Although a
parallel drawn to the medical profession is not perfect, the same concerns affect the
legal profession. Like the medical profession, the legal profession should expressly
preclude its members from exploiting the professional relationship through sexual
involvement, thereby obviating the harms resulting from misuse of transference
and breach of fiduciary responsibilities.
Attorney-OrientedRationales
In addition to the deleterious effect that sexual contact may have on the
client, there are reasons to prohibit such activities which focus on the attorney.
Sexual relations between attorney and client are likely to raise conflicts of interests
for the attorney, as well as to interfere with the attorney's assessment of the client's
best interest. If an attorney becomes emotionally involved with a client, he may
lose sight of what is in the client's best interest and may not be as good of an
advocate for that position.
A difficulty with the initiation of a sexual relationship between an attorney
and client during the course of professional representation is that it results in a
conflict of interest for the attorney. Professor Hazard has stated that "[a] sexual
relationship with a client to some degree always constitutes a professional conflict
of interest." t°P This conflict is likely to render an attorney unable to fulfill his duty
to act in his client's best interest. 103
The Code prohibits an attorney from representing a client if there is or may
be a conflict of interest. DR 5-101 (A) precludes an attorney from accepting
employment "if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests." 101 This rule is supported by EC 5-1 and EC 5-2 which state
that a lawyer's professional judgement and duty to the client should be free from
partiality resulting from his personal interests. t 5

102 Hazard, supra note 6, at 13. Contra Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 105 (In. App. Ct.
1990) ("In the present case the only charge against defendant that alleges a breach of his legal duty to his
client is the allegation that defendant's relationship with plaintiff created a 'potential conflict of interest.'
While this may be true, we also note that plaintiff did not charge that an actual conflict of interest existed
or that she was harmed in her legal action by such a conflict.").
103 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.13 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the loyalty

principle as underlying conflict of interest rules).
104 DR 5-101 (A) excepts such situations where the client consents after full disclosure. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101 (A) (1991). As noted above, however, the client is unable to

consent to a sexual relationship with the attorney, who is a fiduciary.
105 EC 5-1 provides:
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The Rules also address the conflict of interest prohibition. Rule 1.7 provides,
in pertinent part:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own interests ....
t06
The Comments to this rule clearly state that the requisite loyalty to a client is
"impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate
course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or
interests."' 0 7 The Comments to the rule enumerate factors to be considered in
assessing a potential conflict. Those factors include "the duration and intimacy of
the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being
performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely
prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise." t0
As the above review of case law and ethics opinions shows, real conflicts do
arise between the client's interest and the attorney's personal interests in attorneyclient sexual relationships. It is not difficult to imagine potential conflicts arising
from such relationships. The conflict might interfere with the professional
relationship, or it might result in the attorney placing the client's best interests
second to his own personal interests. Nonetheless, the attorney has a professional
duty which mandates that he act in the client's best interest.
Exploitation of a client's vulnerability is hardly in her best interest. Although
some may argue that sexual relations with the client renders the attorney more
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law,
solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.
Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons
should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
MODELCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLTY, EC 5-1 (1991).
EC 5-2 provides:
A lawyer should not accept proffered employment if his personal interests or desires will,
or there is a reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely the advice to be given
or services to be rendered the prospective client. After accepting employment, a lawyer
carefully should refrain from acquiring a property right or assuming a position that would
tend to make his judgment less protective of the interests of his client.
MODELCODE OFPROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-2 (1991).
106 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7 (1991). The rule also excludes situations
where the lawyer does not believe that the representation would be adversely affected and where the
client consents after consultation. As noted above, however, clients have been found to be unable to give
informed consent, while attorneys have been found to be unable to accurately determine whether an
adverse effect exists.
107 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7, §4 cmt. (1991). This section, in
contradistinction to the Code, notes that a possible conflict is not sufficient, but that various enumerated
factors must be considered. This is similar to the court's position in Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d
at
105.
10 8
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONIXuCT, Rule 1.7, §11 cmL (1991).
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protective of the client's interest, it is easy to see how the interests of attorney and
client could diverge. As a result, the attorney's judgement could become colored
rather than remaining detached and professional.
Engaging in sex with a client is tantamount to exploitation 109 and can result
in emotional damage to the client, 10 as well as injure the client's legal position or
ability to effectively obtain legal counsel in the future. Such behavior, implicitly
prohibited by the Code and Rules provisions, implicates an attorney's duty to
refrain from situations generating conflict of interests and to pursue the client's best
interest.
Profession-OrientedRationales
In addition to the concerns about the client and about the attorney's ability to
function objectively, another important reason for expressly prohibiting sexual
relations during representation is the cloud that it places over the profession. Public
perception of the profession is already very negative, and tales of attorneys who
"hit on" their clients may be cited as evidence of this veritable truth. Simply put,
such behavior gives the profession a black eye.
The public's perception of the legal profession should be a concern to
lawyers. " Condonation of attorney-client sexual relations would further denigrate
the already poor impression that the public has of the profession. This could
2
further attenuate levels of public confidence and trust in the profession.
Although the primary purpose of the ethical rules governing the profession
is to protect the public," 3 the rules also seek to maintain the integrity of the
profession. EC 9-6 provides:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of
his profession;.., to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility;
...to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession
and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the
109 See supra text accompanying notes 46-74.
110 It is conceivable that such a relationship could occur and not result in emotional damage to the client.
The level of transference involved in an attorney-client relationship concerning, say, a real estate closing
might be minimal, and sexual conduct might not result in harm. Nonetheless, in those instances when
harm occurs, the result is so egregious that it warrants regulation by the drawing of an explicit, bright line
rule.
111 See, e.g., Fred Strasser, Callfor DisciplinaryReform, NATL L.J., June 3, 1991, at 1.
112 One court, in disbarring an attorney for various acts of harassment, intimidation, and vandalism toward

a client following a sexual relationship, noted that the attorney's "'conduct has lessened public confidence
in the legal profession.'... [His conduct] could not do other than increase the resulting damage to the
image of the legal profession." In re Frick, 694 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (quoting the
special
master).
113
7 AM. Jut. 2d Attorneys at Law §26 (1980).
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public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but
also the appearance of impropriety.
EC 9-1 and EC 9-2 likewise reflect concern over the promotion of public
confidence, as does EC 1-5 which discusses the maintence of high professional
standards and avoidance of "all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct" and
expresses concern over lessening public confidence. 114 Similarly, EC 8-7 states
that attorneys "should be persons of integrity" and should act in ways to help
protect the public."l 5 Although there are no specifically comparable Rules
provisions, 116 the Preamble to the Rules suggests the importance of the public
image of the profession. 117
Since sexual contact with a client is an exploitation of the client's dependence
on and trust in the attorney, such behavior violates these Code and Rules
considerations. It decreases the profession's integrity in the eyes of the public and
exploits, rather than protects, the public.

114 EC 9-1 provides, in pertinent part: "A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in
the legal profession." EC 9-2 provides, in pertinent part: "Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer." EC 1-5 provides, in pertinent part: "A lawyer
should maintain high standards of professional conduct.... He should be temperate and dignified, and he
should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct Because of his position in society, even
minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R ESPONSiBLiTY EC 9-1 (1991).
115 EC 8-7 provides, in pertinent part: "Since lawyers are a vital part of the legal system, they should be
persons of integrity, of professional skill, and of dedication to the improvement of the system." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-7 (1991).
116 The closest rule to these Code provisions is Rule 8.4 of the Rules, included within the "Maintaining
the Integrity of the Profession" section.' This rule provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct
misrepresentation;

involving

dishonesty,

fraud, deceit or

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency
or official; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.4 (1991).
117 "The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest
and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar .... Neglect of... responsibilities
compromise the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves." MODELRULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf, Preamble.
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PROPOSED SOLUTION
Other professions prohibit their members from engaging in sexual relations
with their patients/clients by the respective codes regulating ethical conduct in those
professions. Applicable to doctors is The Principles of Medical Ethics of the
American Medical Association (Principles).' 18 The American Psychiatric
Association (APA) has published annotations to the Principles which are
applicable to psychiatry. Although there is no express provision prohibiting sexual
contact between doctor and patient, the APA annotation to the section regulating
physician interaction with patients and colleagues states that:
[t]he requirement that the physician conduct himself with propriety in
his/her profession and in all the actions of his/her life is especially
important in the case of the psychiatrist .... [T]he necessary intensity
of the therapeutic relationship may tend to activate sexual and other
needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist, while
weakening the objectivity necessary for control. Sexual activity with a
patient is unethical.119
In an opinion by the Ethics Committee on the Principles, the APA explained its
pronouncement: "[t]he psychiatrist is exploiting his patient by not helping him or
her to see that his or her affection for him is a projection of feelings appropriate to
another person at another point in time." 20 And, as indicated previously, the2 1court
in L.L. cited the APA's annotations in its discussion of therapist-patient sex.
Thus, medical ethics clearly prohibit a psychiatrist from having sex with his
patient. Acceptance of the APA's interpretation of the Principles yields a
comparable, albeit implicit, result for physicians in general.
Other professions also address the issue of sexual contact between their
professionals and clients in their ethical codes. For example, the Rabbinic Code of
Ethics states:
We recognize the power that the position of a rabbi frequently entails,
and note particularly the trust our position automatically evokes from
118 For the doctor, the proscription begins with the Hippocratic Oath which states that "[iln every house
where I come, I will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional illdoing and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures of love with women and men." Cited in L.
Riskin, Sexual Relations Between Psychotherapistsand Their Patients: Toward Research or Restraint, 67
CAL. L. REV. 1000, 1002 (1979).
119 THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO
PSYCHIATRY 4, annotation 1 to Section 2 (1985 ed.).
1200 PINIONS OF THE ETHICS C OMMIrEE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY 15, Section 2-d (June 1985).

121 See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
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others. We must therefore not engage in exploitative practices which
destroy our moral integrity. It is unethical, for example, to engage in
extra-marital sexual activity or sexual activity with a child, an
unwilling adult, or someone we are counseling. Sexual relations with
staff members and colleagues who are dependent upon us similarly
are unethical. 122
A rabbi who violates this rule is subject to disciplinary action by the Committee on
123
Ethics and Appeals.
Unlike the medical or rabbinical codes of ethics, there is no comparable
provision in the Code prohibiting attorney-client sex during representation. As we
have seen, however, such a proscription is implicit throughout the Code, in both
the Ethical Considerations, the Disciplinary Rules,t 24 and the Rules. An attorney's
sexual contact with a client may constitute unethical behavior in violation of Code
and Rule provisions dealing with upholding the integrity of the profession,
protection of the client, and conflicts of interest. The implicit provisions in the
Rules are not as extensive as those in the Code. The provisions specifically violated
are EC's 1-5, 5-1, 5-2, 7-11, 7-12, 8-7, 9-1, 9-2, and 9-6, DR's 1-102 (A)(6), 5101 (A), and 7-101 (A)(3), and Rules 1.7 and 8.4. An attorney who disregards
these standards, set by the profession, is subject to disciplinary proceedings. 1
122 Rabbinic Code of Ethics of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, Proposed draft submitted to
the CCAR Convention, June 1991, § 2. In. 4-12. Supplied by Rabbi Jeffrey J. Weisblatt, Temple Ohev
Shalom, Harrisburg, PA.
123 Id. at § 1, In 13-14.
124 Even though the Ethical Considerations are considered aspirational only, they have been held to be
violable. See, e.g., Comm. on Professional Ethics v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1979) ("We
conclude this respondent has violated EC 5-8 and DR 5-103 (A) ....
); Comm. on Professional Ethics &
Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1989). ("Ethical considerations not only
illuminate the disciplinary rules; a violation of an ethical consideration alone is sufficient to support
attorney sanctions.").
125 Besides being subject to disciplinary proceedings, an attorney who engages in sex with a client may
be faced with additional punishments, notably civil action and criminal proceedings. See Cotton v.
Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Mich. 1981). Most frequently, redress against a doctor who has had sexual
contact with his patient is in the form of a medical malpractice action, while the analogous violation in
the legal arena results in disciplinary proceedings. Since the principles for an action for professional
negligence are the same for the medical and legal professions, such a cause of action should be equally
applicable to an attorney. Contra Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Actions
have also been brought against attorneys involved in these sorts of cases for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363 (1991) (attorney's actions constitued
outrageous conduct), and under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Doe v.
Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Criminal sanctions may also be available. Masters and Johnson state that they "feel that when sexual
seduction of patients can be firmly established by due legal process, regardless of whether the seduction
was initiated by the patient or the therapist, the therapist should initially be sued for rape rather than for
malpractice.... ." William Masters and Virginia E. Johnson, Principles of the New Sex Therapy, 133 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 548, 552 (1976). Although prosecutions for rape have been rare, several states have enacted
statutes which adopt Masters and Johnson's suggestion. Wisconsin, for example, has a statute which
expressly makes it a crime for a therapist to have sex with a patient. See STONE, supra note 66, at 196;
see also Simon, supra note 4, at 51 (noting that sexual relations with a patient is a crime in New
Hampshire, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and may be criminal also under the Model Penal Code). One
author states that fifteen states have statutes making such behavior criminal. Simon, supra note 4, at 51.
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Whether or not the existing provisions actually prohibit sexual relations with
clients and whether they are sufficient to protect the public have been the subject of
some controversy. Enacting a well thought out explicit rule, such as California's
proposal, ends such controversy by clearly prohibiting an attorney from engaging
in conduct which might be harmful to the public. The time has come to include an
express prohibition on such potentially harmful conduct.
Although absent from the Code and the Rules, the American Trial Lawyer's
Code of Conduct (ATLA Code), a revision of the Code drafted by the Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, provides such an explicit prohibition.
Under the section on maintaining integrity and competence, Rule 8.8 of the ATLA
Code states that "[a] lawyer shall not commence having sexual relations with a
client during the lawyer-client relationship." The comments to the Rule explain:
Rule 8.8 forbids a lawyer to commence having sexual relations with a
client during the lawyer-client relationship. This rule, like Rule 5.1,
recognizes the dependency of a client upon a lawyer, the high degree
of trust that a client is entitled to place in a lawyer, and the potential for
unfair advantage in such a relationship. Other professionals, such as
psychiatrists, have begun to face up to analogous problems. 126
Hence ATLA, in drafting its code, recognizes not only the transference and
fiduciary elements present in the attorney-client relationship, but also the serious
nature of such behavior and its similarity to that occurring between psychiatrist and
patient.
California also has recently acknowledged the problem of sexual relations in
an attorney-client relationship. In response to a bill requiring the state bar to adopt a
rule addressing sexual relations between attorneys and their clients,' 2 7 the Board of
Governors of the State Bar of California adopted Draft Rule F of the Proposed
Rule of Professional Conduct 3-120, on April 20, 1991. The adopted version of
Rule 3-120, entitled "Sexual Relations With Clients", specifies:

Although many of these statutes expressly prohibit therapist-patient sex, there is no reason not to
extend the liability to attorneys since, as has been shown above, the dynamics and seriousness of the
behavior is comparable to that of therapist-patient relationships. Criminal liability would extend to
attorneys under the statutes phrased in terms of lack of consent since a client is not able to give informed
consent to a sexual relationship with her attorney.
Consequently, an attorney's liability for breaching the attorney-client relationship and exploiting the
vulnerability of the client by engaging in sexual relations during representation of the client could result in
crintinal liability, civil liability, and disciplinary proceedings against the attorney.
26
1 AThA C ClE, Rule 8.8 cmL (Revised Draft 1982). The Preamble to the ATILA CCIE indicates that the

"Rules are followed by Comments, which are not intended to be the basis of disciplinary action, but to
enhance understanding of the disciplinary rules."
127 Amended Assembly Bill No. 415 Regular Session (1989) (enacted) (Roybal-Allard) (adding Business
and Professions Code section 6106.8).
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(A) For purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means sexual
intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(B) A member shall not:
(1) Require or demand sexual relations with a client
incident to or as a condition of any professional
representation; or
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in
entering into sexual relations with a client; or
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom the
member has sexual relations if such sexual relations cause
the member to perform legal services incompetently in
violation of rule 3-110.
(C) Paragraph (B) shall not apply to sexual relations between
members and their spouses or to ongoing consensual sexual
relationships which predate the initiation of the lawyer-client
relationship.
(D) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a client but
does not participate in the representation of that client, the lawyers in
the firm shall not be subject to discipline under this rule solely because
of the occurrence of such sexual relations.
(E) A member who engages in sexual relations with his or her client
will be presumed to violate rule 3-120, paragraph (B)(3). This
presumption shall only be used as a presumption affecting the burden
of proof in disciplinary proceedings involving violations of these rules.
"Presumption affecting the burden of proof' means that presumption
defined in Evidence Code sections 605 and 606.128
This rule is more detailed than the ATLA Code rule in that it defines "sexual
relations", specifies what is proscribed, excepts relationships which predate the
128CALIFORNIA RULES OFPROFESSIONAL C IONDUCr
Rule 3-120 (Draft F 1991) [hereinafter Draft Rule
F] (adopted by the California Supreme Court, in modified form, on August 13, 1992. Finding the adopted
version of the rule to be inadequate, Assemblywoman Roybal-Allard introduced Assembly Bill No. 1400
to the California legislature. The legislation further regulates attorney-client sexual relationships by
prohibiting attorneys from conditioning representation on the client's willingness to engage in sexual
relationships. This new statute, amending the Business & Professions Code Section 6106.9, was enacted
on September 18, 1992 and took effect on January 1, 1993. See 8 ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT
319).
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professional relationship, exempts firm members not representing a firm's
client, 29 and indicates where the burden of proof lies. The California rule reflects a
recognition of the difficulties involved in drafting an explicit rule proscribing
attorney-client sexual relations.
The drafters of California's rule also recognized the underlying rationales
mandating such a rule. The discussion following the rule notes that "a client
exhibits great emotional vulnerability and dependence upon the advice and
guidance of counsel" 1 30 and that "[t]he relationship between an attorney and client
is a fiduciary relationship of the very highest character ... .113 The Subcommittee
was created to draft the new rule, after examining provisions governing
therapist/patient relations, various ethical opinions, existing implicit proscriptions,
and the constitutionality of an express rule, and recommended Draft Rule F, noting
that:
in light of the strong emotional nature of sexual relationships, even if
an attorney were able to predict the consequences of such sexual
relations and explain them to the client, it is doubtful that the client's
consent to continued representation could ever be deemed truly
informed and voluntary. In short, such consent would still beg the
very question it was intended to answer, that is whether sexual
relations were truly consensual and the client's consent truly voluntary
or whether such relations and consent were obtained through undue
13 2
influence on the part of the attorney.
Hence, the drafters of the rule seem to have recognized the need for client
protection based on the existence of transference in an attorney-client relationship
and on the fiduciary nature of the relationship.
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
Two potential objections might be raised to the argument that an express
proscription is required. First is that a per se prohibition is unnecessary because it
is the rare exception when attorney-client sexual relations occur or are harmful.
Second is that such a rule, though necessary, should be limited only to domestic
law cases.

129 A situation whereby the attorney falls under paragraph (D) but not under paragraph (C), that is where
he initiates sexual relations with a firm's client during the course of the fitrm's representation of the client,
should still be ethically proscribed. This issue, however, is left for another day, another paper.
130 Draft Rule F, supra note 128, at i.
131 Id at2.

132 Background accompanying Draft Rule F, supra note 128, at 13.
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The first group of objectors might acknowledge that attorney-client sexual
contacts do occur and that such conduct might, at times, be egregious and harmful
to the client. Nonetheless, they argue that a per se rule prohibiting intimacy
between an attorney and client is unnecessary since it is the rare bad apple who
engages in this type of behavior. 33 Yet, there is a need for a clear cut rule to assist
attorneys in distinguishing proper from improper behavior. The need for such a
rule is underscored by the seriousness of the harm to clients who fall prey to
attorneys who cannot distinguish improper from proper behavior absent a clear
line.13
These bright lines are drawn in many areas of attorneys' conduct governed
by ethical rules. For example, both the Code and the Rules preclude a lawyer from
obtaining publication rights to subject matter related to the representation while the
representation is continuing. 135 Although the frequency with which this scenario
arises is relatively small, the profession has nonetheless imposed a carte blanche
proscription. Similarly, lawyers are prohibited from taking an interest in the subject
matter of litigation. 136 Even though many attorneys could take such an interest
133 This is Joel Feinberg's prohibition objection recloaked. In his Philosophy of Law seminar, Phil 596G,
at the University of Arizona during the Spring of 1991, Professor Feinberg raised the prohibition example,
which essentially questions why prohibition should be imposed upon all because of a few. More
specifically, why should we all be prohibited from drinking because of the few who cannot drink and
behave?
134 Professor Hazard has stated:
Of course, there can be cases where the relationship is genuine and not exploitive. But the
probabilities are stronger the other way. Hence, a per se rule might be justified, making it
professional misconduct to have sexual relations with a client under any circumstances.
Hazard, supra note 6, at 13.
135 DR 5-104 (B) states:
(B) Prior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a
lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client or a prospective
client by which he acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject
matter of his employment or proposed employment.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, DR 5-104 (1991).
Similarly, Rule 1.8 (d) states:
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account
based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 1.8 (1991).
136 DR 5-103 (A) states:
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
MODELCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 5-103 (1991).
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without harming the client, the result in those few cases where the client is harmed
is so egregious that we preclude all from doing so. Thus, although the problem of
attorney-client sexual conduct appears to already be implicitly proscribed by
existing ethical rules governing attorneys, the seriousness of the consequences of
13 7
these acts also warrants drawing a bright line.
The second group of objectors might argue that such a rule should be drafted
to apply only to the domestic law arena. Although sexual contacts between
attorneys and clients occur more often and seem more egregious in the family law
context, they are not limited to a specific specialty. Transference is found in various
types of attorney-client relationships, as is the attorney's role as a fiduciary. At this
point, however, the objector might fine-tune her objection and argue that the
proscription should apply only to those attorney-client relationships which involve
transference or in which the attorney functions as a fiduciary.
Admittedly, there may be instances in which sexual contact could occur
between an attorney and client and not be detrimental to the client or to the
professional relationship.138 However, these instances are the exception rather than
the rule. Even if they were not, drawing a narrow rule is unworkable. Problems in
identifying harmful circumstances and in determining where to draw the line
render the drafting of such a fine-tuned rule difficult and would result in ad hoc
determinations. Furthermore, like the bright line drawn in the publication rights
and subject matter of litigation prohibitions, 139 the difficulty in tailoring a finetuned rule to address only these instances and the seriousness of the consequences
of exploiting a vulnerable client are such that a clear bright line, such as that drawn
by a well thought out prohibition like the California rule, is warranted.
At this point, the objector might contend that, unlike the clear-cut
prohibitions in the publication rights and subject matter of litigation arenas, a clearcut proscription against attorney-client sexual relationships violates the right to

Similarly, Rule 1.8 (j) states:

(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter
of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(I) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses;
and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL C ONDUCr Rule 1.8 (199 1).

137 See Hazard, supra note 6, at 14: "In my opinion, having a sexual relationship with a client is
prohibited by the present rules against conflict of interest between lawyer and clienL Many lawyers
contend otherwise. In any event, there is still grounds for having a specific rule."
138 Jim Friedberg, Professor of Law at West Virginia University, raised the scenario of a corporate
attorney with a sophisticated banker-client, a possibility involving no disparity in power or dependence by
the clienL

139 See -supratext accompanying notes 135-36.
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privacy. Though perhaps addressing a compelling state interest, the argument
might proceed, such a bright line rule would not be the most narrowly drawn
means of achieving that end. 140 The Supreme Court has noted, however, that "any
claim that [the right to privacy] cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally
insulated from state proscription is unsupportable." 141 Thus, the right to privacy
cannot be used to shield private sexual contact with potential deleterious effects.
CONCLUSION
Sexual relations do occur between attorneys and their clients during the
course of representation. Such contact between an attorney and client should be
proscribed for the same reasons that therapist-patient sexual relations are banned:
the existence of transference and the fiduciary nature of the professional
relationship. In addition, conflict of interest principles, the duty to represent the
client's best interest, and the public's perception of the profession also mandate the
drawing of a bright line rule.
The relationship between an attorney and client involves the phenomenon of
transference, whereby the client transfers emotions more appropriately directed
toward another in her life to the attorney who holds an important position in her
life. While experiencing these strong feelings, the client is dependent, vulnerable,
and unable to accurately perceive the relationship. Although an attorney does not
use transference as a primary tool, as does a therapist, nonetheless the
phenomenon is much more intense in the attorney-client setting than in everyday
relationships. Sexual relations with a client exploits the client's vulnerability and
dependence.
Furthermore, an attorney is a fiduciary, that is, he is in a superior position
and is reposed with the client's trust. As such, he has a duty to act in good faith and
to further the client's best interest without harming her or exploiting her inferior
position. Sexual relations with a client constitutes a breach of an attorney's
fiduciary duties.
In addition to these client-oriented rationales, sexual relations between an
attorney and client should be prohibited based on attorney-oriented rationales,
including conflicts of interests for the attorney and a duty to the client's best
interest, as well as profession-oriented rationales, such as the public perception of
the profession. Sexual contact between attorney and client during representation
proves deleterious to the public's perception of the profession. Such a relationship
appears improper, is not in the best interest of the client, and prohibits the attorney
140 Jim Friedberg brought this objection to my attention. A similar argument was raised in opposition to
the recent rule proposed by the Oregon State Bar. Don J. DeBenedictis, Sex-With-Client Ban Fails,78 ABA
1 24 (Feb. 1992).
141 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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from exercising his best judgement. It might result in actual or potential conflicts
of interest.
Due to the deleterious effects that an attorney-client sexual relationship has
on the client, the attorney, and the profession, intimacy between an attorney and
client during representation is unacceptable. Such behavior has been found to be
violative of the Code and the Rules and to warrant disciplinary proceedings. These
proceedings, however, rely on implicit interpretations of the applicable provisions.
This reliance on provisions which implicitly prohibit such behavior yields
uncertainties, gray areas, and numerous interpretations. Thus, a clear bright line
needs to be drawn, establishing an explicit proscription on sexual relations between
an attorney and client. The ATLA Code takes a step in the right direction by
expressly prohibiting attorney-client sexual contact. As depicted in the work of the
State Bar of California, such a rule must be well thought out and carefully drafted.
One might argue that such a draconian application is paternalistic and
overlooks the fact that not all clients are dependent or vulnerable. Nevertheless, the
circumstances when harm does not result are the exceptions rather than the rule.
Tailoring a rule to except those situations makes the rule unworkable and results in
ad hoc determinations. Due to the seriousness of the consequences of the
prohibited behavior, it is more practical to draw a bright line and to require these
few exceptions to seek new counsel. The time has come for such a line to be
clearly and expressly drawn. 142

142 The author would like to thank James J. Friedberg, Patrick C. McGinley, Laurel Terry, and William L.
Wilks for extensive comments on previous drafts of this paper. Special thanks must be extended to my
brother, Joseph K. Goldberg, Esq., for help with the more technical aspects involved in the writing of this,
as well as his patience with the interruptions that providing that assistance caused to his law practice.
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